Friday, August 29, 2014

Administrative Law Tutorial One

Administrative Law Tutorial One

What is administrative law?
            Law relating to control of administration – public power and government, e.g. local, central, hived off or privatised.
                     
What is judicial review?
            English courts è develop set of principles è admin bodies have to observe when making decisions. If rules are breached, applicant may apply for JR è may grant a remedy at court’s discretion.
            Rules for JR set out by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] (GCHQ case)
            JR government by Part 54.1(2) Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). A claim for judicial review means a claim to review the lawfulness of
·        An enactment
·        A decision,
·        Action or failure to act è exercise of public function

How does judicial review differ from an appeal?
            Judicial review è Legality of decision, heard in the ‘administrative court’ (High Court div)
            Appeal è Merits of decision, heard in CA or higher courts

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn per Lord Greene:
            ‘… power of the court, … not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial body which is concerned … only to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of powers which Parliament has confided in them.’

R v CC of North Wales, ex p. Evans [1982] per Lord Hailsham:
            ‘… relevant authorities use their power in a proper manner.’
            ‘ Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process.’
Quoting Lord Evershed
            ‘… a danger of usurpation of power on the part of the courts, under the pretext of having regard to the principles of natural justice…’


R v Secretary of State ex p. Brind [1991] per Lord Lowry:
            ‘courts duty not to interfere with discretion [entrusted by Parliament to a statutory body] … but to maintain a check on excesses in the exercise of discretion.’
·        These decisions uphold the separation of powers è courts should not take decisions properly entrusted to government (for reasons of democracy and institutional competence).
·        However, the principle would come under strain, theorists doubt that judges can help but examine merits of decision when facing questions of ‘reasonability’ and ‘proportionate’.
·        What gives judges the right to subject officials to the principles of JR?
o   Judges giving effect to parliament intent? Or
o   Judges giving effect to common law principles, independent of Pmt intent.

What difference, if any, is there between administrative law and constitutional law?
Admin law can be seen as a sub-category to constitutional law, which concerns the relationship between the individual and the state. Admin law concerns the set of principles that govern administrative decisions.

Describe in outline the different ‘grounds’ of judicial review and their effect.
GCHQ per Lord Diplock:
-        Illegality – whether public body has misdirected itself in law
-        Irrationality: decision too outrageous, Wednesbury reasonableness vs HRA 1998 proportionality test.
-        Procedural impropriety - failure to observe basic rules of natural justice (fundamental unfairness), or failure to observe procedural rules expressly laid down by legislative instrument.

The main rules of natural justice are:

(i) nemo judex in causa sua potest (no man can be a judge in his own cause), which will be breached where the decision-maker has a direct financial interest or has acted both as prosecutor and judge, or where there is a real danger of bias. See: R v Altringham Justices ex parte Pennington (1975)
(ii) audi alteram partem (hear the other side), which requires prior notice to be given of a decision adverse to individual interests together with an opportunity to make representations. See: Ridge v Baldwin (1964).
Insight
Illegality: decision maker must understand correctly the law hat regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it.
e.g.
-        Misdirect on extent of his jurisdiction (Khawaja)
-        Purports to exercise power he does not have (Animistic)
-        Misdirect itself on proper use of powers e.g. discriminatory use
-        Functus officio (‘having performed its office’) è power has expired, used up
-        Use not for purpose power was conferred,
-        Acts in a way that frustrates original purpose
o   Failure/delay
o   Fettering (restraining)
o   Abdicating exercise of powers
-        Not compatible with HRA 1998, or infringes one or more of general principles of EU law

Irrationality
-        Wednesbury unreasonableness èdecision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it’
o   In short è “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come to it”
-        Decision maker took into account irrelevant matters or failed to consider relevant matters (based on what a reasonable public body would have considered relevant, must have taken reasonable steps to acquaint itself to relevant info Newlaw, Tameside)
-        Error of fact – erroneous factual error or erroneous factual conclusion (JR not concerned with merits of decision itself, however there are exceptions to this rule)
-        Disproportionate interference with ECHR rights
-        “where the decision maker is an expert operating in a highly technical field, the court will be very slow to impugn the decion.
-        See (Great NE Railway ltd v Office of rail regulation [2007])
Conflict with proportionality test (HRA 1998) èwhether action pursues a legitimate objective, and whether it is nonetheless excessive in all the circumstances, including by reference to the existence of less intrusive means of achieving the legitimate objective.’

Procedural unlawfulness (ultra vires, unfair, improper)
-        Lord Diplock: ‘whether the process by which a decision maker has reached its decision or otherwise exercised its powers is a fair one.’
e.g.
-        Fails to observe relevant statutory procedures – procedural ultra vires,
-        Fail to notify, provide sufficient information, consult affected parties
-         Fail to observe a procedural legitimate expectation (whether good administration requires that the promise or practice of a decision maker should be honoured)
-        Not being impartial, or biased and prejudiced decision
-        Predetermined decision
-        Fails to provide sufficient reason where there is an express, implied statutory duty, or specific duty in Common Law to do so.

What are the rules on standing (or locus standi) and why are they important? How far is it true to say that the law on standing has been liberalised in recent years?
·        Under CPR 54.5, the applicant must seek permission to apply “within 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”
·        Must also have locus standi è ‘sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates’ Supreme Court Act 1981 s31(3)

 ***
In IRC v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617 the House of Lords held that standing should be considered in two stages. Firstly, at the leave stage the court should refuse locus standi to anyone who appears to be a mere busybody or mischief maker (per Lord Scarman). Secondly, if leave is granted, the court may consider standing again as part of the hearing of the merits of the case, where it may decide that in fact the applicant does not have a sufficient interest.

Where interest or pressure groups are concerned the issue of locus standi has been more complicated. Where a group is acting in relation to a decision which directly affects its own interests, no problem arises as it is acting in the same way as an individual (eg R v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 QB 299). However, where the group has been formed simply to challenge a decision which does not directly concern its members, it will not have sufficient standing (R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Rose Theatre Trust [1990] 1 QB 504. Yet, where the group can demonstrate that some or all of its members are personally interested in the decision locus standi will be found (R v HM Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329. Furthermore, even where the group cannot demonstrate personal interest on the part of its members, if it is a highly respected ‘expert' group standing is still likely to be found (R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 611)

Lawteacher.net
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Can groups (or individuals on behalf of groups) bring judicial review action?   Should they be able to do so? 

KEY CASE: v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Trust [1990] 1 All ER 754
Concerning: The standing of interest groups
Facts
The Rose Theatre Trust was set up to preserve the remains of an ancient theatre that was found during some development works. The group made an application to the Secretary of State for an order under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Act 1979 that would give the remains protected status. The application was refused and the Trust sought to challenge this decision by way of judicial review.
Legal principle
The Divisional Court ruled that the Trust did not have standing to challenge the decision.   An individual does not have sufficient interest in an executive decision just because they are concerned about it or its effect. A collection of people without sufficient interest could not obtain standing as a result of grouping together or forming an organisation. In essence, if the individual members do not have standing, the group will not have standing. (R v Inland Revenue ex p Federation followed)
KEY CASE: v. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace [1994] 4 All ER 329
Concerning: The standing of interest groups
Facts
The environmental pressure group, Greenpeace, sought to bring judicial review proceedings against the decision of the Inspectorate of Pollution to authorise the discharge of radioactive waste from the Thorp nuclear plant in Cumbria. Greenpeace had 2500 members or supporters living in the area likely to be affected by the decision.
Legal principle
The Divisional Court held that the court should take into account the nature of the applicant, its interests in the issues raised, the remedy it sought to achieve and the nature of the relief sought. Greenpeace was a responsible organization with an established reputation for its interest in environmental matters and some of its members, who would have had standing in their own right, lived in the area affected.
KEY CASE: v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ex p. World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386
Concerning: The standing of pressure groups
Facts
An organization obtained financial aid from the Secretary of State to construct a hydro-electric power station on the Pergau river in Malaysia despite concerns that this was not a good use of the overseas aid budget as the project was uneconomic and not a sound development project. The World Development Movement, an anti-poverty campaign group, sought judicial review of the decision to grant aid for the project. The issue was whether the group had standing to challenge the decision. 
 
Legal principle
It was held that the challenge was a meritorious one that ought to be heard by the courts and that this was to be treated as an important factor when considering whether a group had standing. Further factors that supported a finding that the group had sufficient interest to mount a challenge were the likely absence of any other challenger and the prominent role of the group in terms of the knowledge, expertise and resources to mount a challenge. (this is widening of the rule)(busy-body principle?)

Gonna make my own case briefs and add them later I can't do everything in one day.